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Abstract
A judgment creditor who obtains a freezing order in one eu Member State may seek 
to enforce it in another Member State. When judgment creditors seek to enforce such 
orders, the judgment debtors may appeal against the enforcement orders. This article 
examines how protective measures can be guaranteed pending such enforcement ap­
peals under the Brussels legal regime. Relevant legal provisions and the case law of 
the Court of Justice are considered. There is also an examination of the recent English 
response to the Brussels legal regime and an argument that the judgment creditor is 
entitled to protective measures. Drawing support from public policy and mutual trust 
considerations, this article concludes that exercising judicial discretion in granting 
protective measures pending appeals undermines legal certainty.
Keywords
world wide freezing orders – English enforcement – appeals
1 Introduction
Courts may freeze the assets of judgment debtors to ensure judgment credi­
tors can reap the fruits of their judgments through enforcement.1 Otherwise, 
1 In England, “freezing injunctions” were previously known as “Mareva injunctions”. The latter 
took its name from the leading case of Mareva Compania Naviera s.a. v International Bulk-
carriers s.a. [1975] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 509 (c.a.). See generally Crédit Suisse Fides Trust sa v Cuoghi 
[1998] qb 818.
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the fair and efficient administration of justice will be undermined.2 Assets 
may be in countries other than those in which freezing orders were granted. 
Free movement within the European Union has given impetus to major com­
panies and influential business people acquiring assets abroad.3 Returning to 
the court to obtain a freezing order each time new assets are discovered in a 
new jurisdiction would be cumbersome and inefficient. This is especially so as 
modern technology promotes quick transfers of assets. The increasing com­
plexity of international business transactions implies that such assets may be 
interconnected in different jurisdictions within or outside Europe.
The initial scepticism and even hostility towards Worldwide Freezing Or­
ders (wfos) endured for a long time. Such scepticism was particularly intense 
outside Europe,4 but also significant in Europe which is essentially divided be­
tween influences or approaches of the common law and civil law jurisdictions.5 
There is, however, a growing acceptance of wfos.6 To illustrate the increasing 
acceptance of wfos, English wfos have been enforced by local attachment in 
European countries such as Switzerland,7 France,8 and Latvia.9 The English 
courts are also willing to enforce wfos from other Member States. The 
English High Court recently enforced a wfo obtained in Cyprus,10 a country 
which asserted that its courts had the competence to grant wfos a decade ear­
lier.11 In the same decade, the English High Court asserted its competence and 
willingness to enforce a Greek wfo under the Brussels Regulation 44/2001.12
2 Gambazzi v Daimler Chrysler Canada Inc Case C­394/07; ecr i­02563 para. 30.
3 B. Akkermans, “Property Law and the Internal Market” in S. van Erp et al. (eds.), The Fu-
ture of European Property Law (Sellier European Law Publishers, 2012) pp. 222–223.
4 B. Hess, T. Pfeiffer and P. Schlosser, Report on the Application of Regulation Brussels i in the 
Member States (Ruprecht­Karls­Universität, 2007) para. 707.
5 (n 4) para. 709.
6 For an overview of relevant laws in some eu Member States (including France, Belgium, 
Italy, Switzerland, and Germany), see M.S.W. Hoyle, Freezing and Search Orders (4th edn, 
Informa Law from Routledge, 2006) paras.  11.26–11.31.
7 Swiss Federal Tribunal atf 129 iii 626; Donzallaz, La Convention de Lugano, Berne 1997, 
N° 2450. See generally, art 27 of the Swiss Debt Enforcement and Bankruptcy Act. Fenti­
man describes this as “exporting the injunction”. See R Fentiman, International Commer-
cial Litigation (2nd edn, Oxford University Press, 2015) paras. 17.75–17.78.
8 Stolzenberg v Societe Daimler Chrysler Canada, Cour de Cassation, 1 re civ, 30 June 2004 
See Fentiman (n 7) paras. 17.75–17.78.
9 Case C­559/14 Meroni v Recoletos Ltd eu:c:2016:120; eu:c:2016:349; [2017] qb 85.
10 Cyprus Popular Bank Public Co Ltd v Vgenopoulos [2016] ewhc 1695 (qb); [2017] 2 wlr. 67.
11 Seamark Consultancy Services Limited v Joseph P Lasala et al. [2007] 1 clr 162.
12 On the facts, the court decided that it was against public policy to do so since the order 
was no longer in force. See Trisha D’Hover v Tritan Enterprises [2009] ewhc 949 (qb) 
paras. 10 and 12.
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This article focuses on the European judicial area with particular reference 
to the Brussels legal regime: the Brussels Regulation 44/2001 (Brussels i) and 
the Brussels Recast Regulation 1215/2012 (Brussels i bis), both of which trace 
their ancestry to the Brussels Convention of 1968.13 Under the Brussels legal 
regime, there are provisions concerning appeals against enforcing judgments 
obtained in other jurisdictions.14 As will be discussed in detail later,15 the 
definitions of “judgment” in both Brussels i and Brussels i bis generally include 
provisional measures.16 It is rather axiomatic that judgment debtors try to 
frustrate or delay the enforcement of judgments as much as they can. While 
an appeal against the enforcement of a judgment is pending, the judgment 
creditor needs to ensure the judgment debt can be realised should the appeal 
turn out to be in his favour. In fairness to the judgment debtor, it is important 
that no irreversible loss is suffered before the conclusion of the appeal because 
the judgment creditor may lose the appeal. Brussels i provides a mechanism 
by which judgment creditors can prevent the dissipation of assets pending 
an appeal against the enforcement of a freezing order obtained in another 
Member State.17 This is based on an entitlement to protective measures re­
garding the assets while the appeal lasts.18 There is, however, evidence that the 
English position rejects the provision of protective measures pending ap­
peal as an entitlement and that such provision is discretionary. This article 
queries this position and it is necessary first to have a brief insight into the 
emergence of the English wfo.19 The early history of English freezing or­
ders is quite convoluted,20 even as the scope and application of worldwide 
freezing orders have remained dynamic. For example, the Supreme Court 
of the United Kingdom recently decided that a respondent should not in­
cur certain forms of debt which have the effect of reducing the respondent’s 
13 The Lugano Convention (which has similar provisions regarding protective measures) is 
referred to where necessary, especially in the context of Switzerland. See art 31 of the 
Lugano Convention 2007.
14 See art 38 of Brussels i and art 40 of Brussels i bis.
15 Section iii of this article on “wfos under the Brussels (and Lugano) Legal Regime”. In 
particular, see Section iii (b) on “Provisional, including protective, measures”.
16 See art 32 of Brussels i and art 2 (second paragraph) of Brussels i bis.
17 Art 43 of Brussels i.
18 This is a core argument of this article.
19 The context that follows is stated generally because it will help to understand the post­
Brexit (and possibly post­Brussels) discussion towards the end of this article.
20 See C. McLachlan, “International Litigation and the Reworking of the Conflict of Laws”, 
Law Quarterly Review (2004) 584. See also: The Siskina v Distos Compania Naviera s.a [1979] 
ac 210; Ashtiani v Kashi [1987] qb 888 (ca).
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assets.21 This was in spite of the court’s observation about a “settled under­
standing” that borrowings did not fall within the remit of the standard form of 
freezing order.22 In upturning the decision of the Court of Appeal, the Supreme 
Court decided that proceeds of the loan agreements were “assets” within the 
extended definition in paragraph 5 of the standard form of freezing order.23 
Such enduring dynamism underscores the speed with which freezing orders 
have evolved in their application by the English courts.24 It took less than two 
decades for the common law to catch up with and surpass the civil law rem­
edies concerning freezing orders, as now encapsulated in wfos.25 Article 24 
of the Brussels Convention of 1968 required Member States to make appropri­
ate provisional or protective measures to assist the courts of other Member 
States.26 To what extent the Brussels Convention of 1968 formed the founda­
tion for statutory law in the United Kingdom to empower courts to grant wfos 
is not particularly critical,27 since Section 25 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judg­
ments Act (cjja) specifically empowers the courts to grant wfos.28 Provisions 
in Brussels i bis concerning the foreign court’s jurisdiction over the substance 
21 This was in the context of the standard form of order. See jsc bta Bank v Ablyazov [2015] 
1 wlr 4754, 4767 (sc).
22 (n 21). See generally: Cantor Index Ltd v Lister [2002] cp Rep 25 and Anglo Eastern Trust Ltd 
v Kermanshahgi [2002] ewhc 1702 (Ch).
23 Ablyazov (n 21) 4768 para. 39. On further clarification of the definition of “assets” with 
respect to standard from freezing order and a wholly owned company, see Latakamia 
Shipping Company Limited v Nobu su [2014] ewca Civ 636 and Group Seven Ltd v Allied 
Investment Corporation Ltd [2013] ewhc 1509 (Ch).
24 In fact, in the Supreme Court’s judgment in Ablyazov (n 21), the word “extended” ap­
peared at least 16 times, all in the context of defining “assets”.
25 McLachlan partly attributed this to the Brussels Convention which became effective in 
the uk in 1989, and on which basis the uk enacted local legislation to support litigation 
in other Convention countries. See McLachlan (n 20) 591. See also Republic of Haiti v 
Duvalier [1990] 1qb 202.
26 See art 31 of the Brussels 1 Regulation – Regulation (ec) No. 44/2001 and now art 35 of the 
Brussels Recast – Regulation (eu) No. 1215/2012. See also art 31 of the Lugano Convention 
of 2007.
27 In an earlier edition of Dicey, it was more significant. See Dicey, Morris & Collins, The 
Conflict of Laws (14th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2006) para. 8–024.
28 S 25(1) of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 [Interim Relief] Order 1997. See 
also s 37(1) of the Senior Courts Act of 1981. Since 1997, a decade after it became it became 
applicable to other Convention States, the power in s 25 (3) has been exercisable to States 
in the context of both the Brussels and Lugano Conventions. See Dicey, Morris & Collins, 
The Conflict of Laws (15th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) paras. 8–027 to 8–029. See generally, 
icici Bank uk plc v Diminico nv [2014] ewhc 3124 (Comm).
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of the dispute imply that wfos granted pursuant to Section  25 of the cjja 
will not be enforceable in other Member States29 As will be discussed later 
in this article, however, the cjja may assume greater practical importance if 
the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union implies that the Brus­
sels legal regime will be disapplied. Discussions concerning a post­Brexit legal 
order are otherwise beyond the scope of this article and speculative as it is 
difficult to determine the fine details of a post­Brexit legal order. For now, it is 
important to understand why the English approach to wfos seems inclined 
to a discretionary judicial attitude as is the case with injunctive and equitable 
reliefs generally.
Subject to the foreign court’s jurisdiction concerning substantive pro­
ceedings, provisional or protective measures are obtainable and enforceable 
among Member States under the Brussels legal regime.30 However, the English 
attitude to wfos is particularly relevant for analysis in this article because of 
London’s special international commercial status. The history and evolution of 
wfos have created the tendency for English courts to demonstrate their com­
petence and willingness to be flexible with a view to facilitating international 
commercial litigation and ultimately dispensing justice. In doing so, however, 
fresh challenges have arisen. This article examines whether a discretionary 
attitude is justifiable or desirable when judgment creditors seek protective 
measures with respect to wfos in English courts during appeals against en­
forcement orders.
This article first briefly explains the nature of a wfo from an English per­
spective. Both Brussels i and Brussels i bis are considered because Brussels i 
continues to apply to proceedings instituted (and orders obtained) before 10 
January 2015.31 The article further explores the case law of the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (cjeu) and scholarly views concerning the provision of 
protective measures pending appeal in the court where enforcement is sought. 
The English position is then considered, especially a recent High Court case 
which clearly stated that granting protective measures pending appeals was 
discretionary. This article concludes, supported by public policy and mutual 
trust considerations, that the provision of protective measures pending appeal 
is an entitlement. A judicial discretion to grant protective measures pending 
appeals undermines legal certainty.
29 Fentiman (n 7) para. 17.220.
30 Recital 33 of Brussels i bis.
31 As earlier stated, the Lugano Convention is briefly considered in the context of Switzer­
land because orders are often made concerning that country. See Fentiman (n 7) para. 
17.183.
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2 The Nature and Enforcement of wfos
Various European countries such as Germany,32 the Netherlands,33 France,34 
and Switzerland35 have mechanisms for the protection of assets pending liti­
gation. Since wfos are enforced by the domestic mechanisms available, it is 
necessary to understand the purpose of a wfo. This explanation is from an 
English standpoint for two reasons. First, the English High Court made pro­
nouncements in recent cases relevant to the main analysis in this article. Sec­
ondly, the English law and practice constitute the comparative baseline for this 
article.
Essentially, a wfo is designed to prevent a defendant against whom such an 
order was granted from dissipating or disposing of assets which could be the 
subject of enforcement in the event that the claimant succeeds in the main 
case.36 However, this aim does not include giving the claimant security for a 
claim.37 The preservation of such assets should also be subject to dealings in the 
ordinary course of business.38 Otherwise, there would be a risk of oppressive 
32 The Arrest and the einst weilige verf  ϋgung (provisional injunction). See para. 24 of 
C. Kessedjian, “Note on Provisional and Protective Measures on Private International Law 
and Comparative Law” Enforcement of Judgments Prel. Doc. No. 10 October 1998 https://
assets.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgmpd10.pdf (accessed 7 March 2017); W.D. Park and S.J.H. 
Cromie, International Commercial Litigation (Butterworth & Co (Publishers) Ltd 1990) 
p. 304.
33 E.g. protective attachment orders and the kort geding (summary procedure for interim 
payment). See C Kessedjian (n 32) para. 109.
34 Mesures conservatoires (protective measures). See generally, C. Kessedjian (n 32) paras. 
87–89 and 95–97; W.D. Park and S.J.H. Cromie, International Commercial Litigation (But­
terworth & Co (Publishers) Ltd, 1990) 302.
35 A sequestration order and injunctions to ensure provisional/protective measures (vorso-
gliche Massnahme/ provisorische Massnahme); Kessedjian (n 32) para. 122.
36 It is granted in personam. Dicey, Morris & Collins (n 28) para. 8–009. Recent English cases 
concerning wfos generally include: Haederle v Thomas [2016] ewhc 3498 (Ch); Gerald 
Metals sa v Timis [2016] ewhc 2327 (Ch); scf Tankers Ltd (Formerly Fiona Trust and Hold-
ing Corp) v Privalov [2017] ewca Civ 1877; Great Station Properties v ums Holdings [2017] 
ewhc 3330 (Comm).
37 This is also known as the enforcement principle. The two other principles central to freez­
ing orders are: the flexibility principle and strict construction principle. See Ablyazov 
(n 21) 4761.
38 Ibid 4763. See also jsc bta Bank v Solodchenko [2010] ewca Civ 1436; 2011 1wlr 888, 890 
para. 52.
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conduct against the defendant, which is not the aim of a wfo.39 This under­
scores the need for a “clear and equivocal” order which must be “strictly con­
strued” in favour of the defendant.40
A wfo may be granted in support of domestic or foreign proceedings and 
concerning assets within or outside the jurisdiction of the English court.41 
Considering the Brussels legal regime, judgment creditors can appeal against 
the orders that allow registration in the English courts.42 The English court 
should have “no discretion to whether or not to grant an interim relief to pre­
vent a dissipation of assets while such an appeal is pending”.43 In enforcing 
wfos emanating from other Member States, the English courts have indicated 
a tendency to depart from the cjeu legal regime. For example, in the light of 
van Uden,44 the cjeu stipulated some criteria for consideration in Mietz v In-
ternship YatchingSneek.45 Of particular note is the need for a connection be­
tween the subject matter of the measures which the applicant seeks and the 
territorial jurisdiction in which the applicant seeks those measures. Referring 
to an English decision concerning a wfo obtained in Greece,46 Fentiman ar­
gued that the “English courts appear to have approached the enforcement of 
worldwide orders originating in other eu states without reference to the Mietz 
39 Landmark cases in the context of mitigating the otherwise potentially draconian effects 
of freezing orders include: Dadourian Group International Inc v Simms [2006] ewca Civ 
399; [2006] 1wlr 2499; Babanaft International Co. sa v Bassatne [1990] Ch 13, 41 (ca); 
Baltic Shipping v Translink Shipping Ltd [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 673 (Comm).
40 This is also known as the strict construction principle. Ibid 4763. See also Mercedes Benz 
ag v Leiduck [1996] ac 284, 297 (pc).
41 In support of substantive English proceedings, see sca 1981, s 37(1) and cpr r.25.1 On the 
position that there is no need to invoke s 25 of the cjja 1982 or cjja 1982 (Interim Relief) 
Order 1997 in support of English proceedings, see Masri v Consolidated Contractors Inter-
national Co sal [2007] ewhc 3010 (Comm); [2008] 1 All e.r. (Comm) 305.
42 Hoyle (n 6) 10.32–10.33; art 39 of Brussels i.
43 Holye reached this conclusion based on relevant authorities and reports including art 39 
of Brussels i, the Jenard Report, and the cjeu decision of Capelloni v Pelkmans (C­119/84) 
which is discussed in detail later. See Hoyle (n 6) 10.34. See also the decision of the Irish 
High Court (there was “no discretion to refuse” pending an appeal against the enforce­
ment order concerning an English judgment under the Brussels legal regime) in Elwyn 
(Cottons) Ltd v Pearle Designs Ltd. [1990] i.l.Pr. 40. Cf Hoyle (n 6) para. 10.35 on the English 
position.
44 Case C­391/95 Van Uden Maritime b.v. (Trading As Van Uden Africaline) v Kommanditge-
sellschaft In Firma Deco-Line [1988] ecr i­7091; [1999] q.b. 1225.
45 Case C­99/96; [1999] ecr i­2277. Cf Comet Group Plc v Unika Computer sa [2004] i.l.Pr 1.
46 Trisha D’Hoker v Tritan Enterprises [2009] ewhc 949 (qb) para. 10.
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test”.47 The jurisdictional link aside, there are other considerations for the Eng­
lish court.48 Having considered some general principles underlying English 
wfos, it is necessary to consider the Brussels legal regime in detail.
3 wfos under the Brussels (and Lugano) Legal Regime
3.1 Legal Provisions
The first part of this subsection generally discusses legal provisions that are 
relevant to this article. The next part focuses on the meaning of “provisional, 
including protective measures” and its implications for obtaining protective 
measures pending appeals against enforcement orders. The Brussels legal re­
gime and the Lugano Convention do not specifically mention the term wfos.
Brussels i provides: “Application may be made to the courts of a Member 
State for such provisional, including protective, measures as may be available 
under the law of that State, even if, under this Regulation, the courts of another 
Member State have jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter.”49 A weak­
ness of Brussels i is that the foreign court could abuse jurisdiction in granting 
provisional measures. Brussels i bis seems to address this concern. There is 
now a distinction between cases where the foreign court had “jurisdiction as 
to the substance of the matter” and other cases where such jurisdiction does 
not exist. In the former case, there should be a free circulation of provisional 
measures. In the latter case, however, the effect of such provisional measures 
should be confined to the Member State from where the measures emanated 
and thus cannot be enforced in other Member States.50 These provisions con­
cerning the foreign court’s jurisdiction over the substance of a matter should 
help to prevent any assertion of exorbitant jurisdiction.51 Another implication 
of these provisions is that protective measures should be enforced more read­
ily abroad if such measures comply with Brussels i bis. Thus, courts (including 
English courts) should have a clearer basis to ensure judgment creditors are 
entitled to protective measures that exist under the law of the Member State 
47 Fentiman (n 7) para. 17.224.
48 In the next subsection, there will be a discussion of a substantive jurisdictional link in the 
foreign court. See Recital 33 of Brussels i bis.
49 Art 31 of the Lugano Convention is essentially the same as art 31 of the Brussels i.
50 Recital 33 of Brussels i bis. Art 35 of the Brussels i bis.
51 Although recital 33 “does open a window for national law” in enforcing provisional mea­
sures, this must be considered in the light of jurisdiction (including “as to the substance 
of the matter” under Brussels i. See F.M. Wilke, “The Impact of the Brussels i Recast on 
Important Brussels Case Law”, Journal of Private International Law 11(1) (2015) 128, 135–136.
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addressed.52 Judgment creditors should be entitled to protective measures 
pending appeals against the enforcement of such judgments. The provisions of 
Brussels i bis do not diminish this entitlement. For example, recital 33 further 
emphasises that the protective measures must have emanated from proceed­
ings in which the defendant was summoned to appear, or the defendant must 
otherwise have been notified before enforcement. It is difficult to appreciate 
why the defendant must be notified before enforcement if there is no opportu­
nity to express a valid concern or even object to enforcement especially where 
an enforcement could imply an irreparable loss. During this period, the judg­
ment creditor should be entitled to protective measures. This entitlement will 
be discussed in detail later.
Although there is no need for a “declaration of enforceability”53 or the exe-
quatur under Brussels i bis,54 grounds for the non­recognition/enforcement of 
foreign judgment remain under this new legal regime.55 The English attitude 
to enforcing wfos under Brussels i remains relevant, despite the abolition of 
the exequatur, because the judgment debtor retains a right to obtain “any pro­
tective measures which exist under the law of the Member State addressed”.56 
Furthermore, abolishing the exequatur does not necessarily imply that the do­
mestic procedural law on the Member State of the court addressed is avoided. 
Arguably, “there is nothing in the adopted Recast that prohibits the court from 
suspending or limiting measures of enforcement during the time that the de­
fender is allowed to lodge an appeal.”57 There is much to recommend in this 
view because legal provisions concerning appeals against judgments including 
provisional measures under Brussels i bis could be clearer. Under Brussels i bis 
for example, the courts addressed can allow the enforcement of judgments 
“subject to a limitation of the enforcement or to the provision of security” 
pending a challenge to the enforcement of a judgment.58 When this provision 
is read vis­à­vis article 40 which provides that judgment creditors are entitled 
to protective measures, it is difficult to consider that abolishing the exequatur 
greatly diminishes the need to enforce provisional orders pending appeals.59 
52 Art 40 of Brussels i bis.
53 Art 43(1) of Brussels i.
54 Art 39 of Brussels i bis.
55 Art 45 of Brussels i bis.
56 Art 40 of Brussels i bis.
57 L.J. Timmer, “Abolition of Exequatur under the Brussels i Regulation: ill Conceived and 
Premature?”, Journal of Private International Law 9(1) (2013) 129, 139–140.
58 Recital 31 of Brussels i bis.
59 Also, cf recital 33 and the definition of “judgment” under art 2.
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Thus, legal analysis applicable to Brussels i is also insightful concerning Brus­
sels i bis. Case law under Brussels i continues to apply with respect to Brussels 
i bis unless there is a clear departure from previous legal provisions.60 Also, as 
will be discussed in the next section, the definition of “judgment” includes “or­
der” under Brussels i and Brussels i bis. Under Brussels i, Brussels i bis, and the 
Lugano Convention, “provisional, including protective, measures” is of central 
importance in understanding why judgment creditors should be entitled to 
protective measures pending appeals against enforcement orders.
3.2 “Provisional, Including Protective, Measures”
Defining what would amount to “provisional, including protective, measures” 
is difficult but it is necessary to understand the term.61 Provisional or protec­
tive measures ordinarily constitute something less than a full judgment.62 
Such measures are generally used to preserve factual and legal situations 
with a view to safeguarding relevant rights.63 The measures may also provide 
non­final reliefs.64 The critical point is that the measures do not decide issues 
definitively – a feature otherwise reflected in judgments generally.65 Under 
the Brussels legal regime, the meaning of “judgment” is very wide and it in­
cludes “a decree, order, decision or writ of execution”.66 Brussels i bis clearly 
includes “provisional, including protective, measures”.67 Also, to fall within 
the remit of “judgment”, the defendant must have had a chance to appear 
except the defendant is served with the relevant judgment or order before 
enforcement.68 There have been efforts to define and delimit “provisional, 
60 Recital 34 of Brussels i bis.
61 Maher and Rodger wrote in the context of art 24 of the Brussels Convention containing 
provisions similar to art 35 of the Brussels Recast. See G. Maher and B.J. Rodger, “Provi­
sional and Protective Remedies: The British Experience of the Brussels Convention”, Inter-
national and Comparative Law Quarterly 48(2) (1999) 304.
62 T. Kruger, “Provisional and Protective Measures” in: A Nuyts and N Watté (eds.), Interna-
tional Civil Litigation in Europe and Relations with Third States (Bruylant, 2005) p. 313.
63 Van Uden (n 44) para. 37; see also para. 28 of Banco Nacionalde Comercio Exterior snc v 
Empresa de Telecommunicaciones de Cuba sa [2007] [2007] ewca Civ 662; [2008] 1wlr 
1936. para. 28; Case C­261/90 Reichert v Dresdner Bank [1992] ecr i­2149 para. 34.
64 Kruger (n 62) 313.
65 For the view that a judgment which is otherwise final should not be less so because it is 
appealable, see P. Barnett, Res Judicata, Estoppel, and Foreign Judgments: The Preclusive 
Effects of Foreign Judgments in Private International Law (Oxford University Press 2001) 17.
66 Art 32(1) of Brussels i; art 2(a) of Brussels i bis; art 32 of the Lugano Convention.
67 Art 2(a) second paragraph of Brussels i bis.
68 See generally arts 2(a); 43(1) and 45(1) (b) of Brussels i bis.
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including protective, measurers” by the cjeu. In Reichert v Dresdner Bank,69 
the cjeu considered that the effects of the French action paulienne varied the 
legal position of relevant assets rather than merely preserve their legal posi­
tion.70 The French action enabled creditors to sue third parties who were re­
lated to debtors as successors in title. The action involved a detailed analysis 
of the merits resulting in a conclusive protection of the creditor’s substantive 
rights. Since such a relief was irreversible, it was correct not to characterise 
the French action as provisional.71 Where a provisional or protective measure 
involves an interim payment, such a payment would not be provisional if it 
is unconditional and does not guarantee the possibility of repayment.72 This 
clarification is important because there are differences between European le­
gal systems with respect to interim payments.73
Such measures are on the same pedestal as judgments under the Brussels 
regime.74 Efforts to define what amounts to “provisional measures” have either 
been unsuccessful or arguably unnecessary. Such a definition would perhaps 
raise more questions than deliver answers.75 Despite the absence of such a 
definition, wfos are provisional measures within the meaning of the Brussels 
legal regime and may be enforced in other Member States.76
These provisions are important because they provide the bases on which 
judgment debtors can seek protective measures pending appeals against the 
enforcement of wfos by judgment debtors. Under Brussels i, either party 
69 (n 63).
70 Reichert v Dresdner Bank (n 63) para. 35.
71 I. Pretelli, “Provisional and Protective Measures in the European Civil Procedure of the 
Brussels i System” in V. Lazić and S. Stuij (eds.), Brussels Ibis Regulation: Changes and Chal-
lenges of the Renewed Procedural Scheme (Asser Press/ Springer, 2017) p. 103.
72 Fawcett and Carruthers explained this in the context of the Dutch kort geding. See J Faw­
cett and jm Carruthers, Cheshire, North and Fawcett: Private International Law (14th edn, 
Oxford University Press 2008) 316–317. See also J. Hill and M.N. Shύilleabháin, Clarkson 
and Hill’s Conflict of Laws (5th edn, Oxford University Press, 2016) para. 2.284.
73 In the context of anticipatory measures, which interim payment is subsumed under, 
see X.E. Kramer, “Harmonisation of Provisional and protective Measures in Europe” in: 
M Storme (ed.), Procedural Laws in Europe: Towards Harmonisation (Maklu Publishers, 
2003) pp. 305–306. https://www.academia.edu/1555122/Harmonisation_of_provisional_
and_protective_measures_in_Europe (accessed 7 March 2017).
74 See art 32(1) of Brussels i; art 2(a) of Brussels i bis; art 32 of the Lugano Convention. 
Cf Banco Nacional (n 63) paras. 1 and 29. On the facts, it was inexpedient to grant a wfo.
75 X.E. Kramer, The Dutch Kort Geding Procedure in an International Perspective: A Com-
parative View on Provisional Measures and Private International Law. Available on ssrn: 
file:///C:/Users/pnokoli/Downloads/SSRN­id1122344.pdf (accessed 7 March 2017).
76 Art 32(1) of Brussels i; art 2(a) of Brussels i bis; art 32 of the Lugano Convention.
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may appeal against a declaration of enforceability within one month of ser­
vice or within two months if the other party is domiciled in a Member State 
different from that in which the declaration of enforceability is given.77 The 
applicant should not be prevented from taking advantage of “provisional, in­
cluding protective” measures in accordance with the law of the court in which 
enforcement is sought.78 In particular, “the declaration of enforceability shall 
carry with it the power to proceed to any protective measures.”79 During the 
appeal, only protective measures can be taken against the property of the re­
spondent.80 The requirement of a declaration of enforceability was abolished 
in Brussels i bis. Whether the judgment debtor should obtain such protective 
measures while an appeal against enforcing a wfo is pending requires a fur­
ther examination of relevant legal provisions and case law.
4 The cjeu and Supporting Commentaries
In the Brennero case,81 the cjeu observed that where an appeal was pending, 
the judgment creditor may “take only” protective measures against the prop­
erty of the judgment debtor against whom enforcement is sought. No enforce­
ment measures may be effective until the appeal is concluded. Brennero was 
insightful, but it turned out to be a foundation for a clearer and more specific 
pronouncement by the cjeu.
In Capelloni v Pelkmans,82 the cjeu considered similar provisions in article 
39 of the Brussels Convention and in the context of a Dutch judgment creditor 
who sought to enforce his judgment in Italy. A major issue was whether the 
judgment creditor could proceed directly with protective measures pending 
appeal, without any need for specific authorisation.83 The cjeu decided that it 
was not necessary for the judgment creditor who had obtained authorisation 
for enforcement to obtain a separate authorisation to proceed with protective 
measures.84 Such a party had “the right to take such measures”.85
77 Art 43(1) and 43(5) of Brussels i; Lugano Convention.
78 Art 47(1) of Brussels i; Lugano Convention.
79 Art 47(2); Lugano Convention.
80 Art 47(3); Lugano Convention.
81 Case 258/83 Brennero v Wendel [1984] ecr 3871 para. 11.
82 (n 43).
83 Capelloni (n 43) para. 5.
84 Capelloni (n 43) para. 24.
85 Capelloni (n 43) para. 25.
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Commenting on Section  47 of the Brussels Regulation, Pålsson suggested 
that the judgment creditor was “entitled to take any protective measures avail­
able under the law of the State requested” upon obtaining a declaration of en­
forceability.86 The rationale behind this entitlement is that since the judgment 
creditor is unable to enforce the judgment (pending an appeal), the judgment 
debtor should be prevented from dissipating relevant assets and thus render­
ing future enforcement fruitless or even impossible. Pålsson emphasised that 
the entitlement “arises automatically and is unconditional”.87 Indeed, the judg­
ment creditor neither needs to obtain a separate decision authorising the pro­
tective measures,88 nor show probable cause for such a claim.89
Some other scholars have favoured the entitlement of the applicant to pro­
tective measures pending appeal less clearly but no less effectively. For exam­
ple, on the need to maintain the status quo considering Capelloni, a Spanish 
judge seemed to support an entitlement. The judge noted: “Therefore, a court 
of a State with jurisdiction to enforce the judgment has jurisdiction to grant 
measures, even where measures are not foreseen prior to enforcement by its 
procedural law (they are not in Spain).”90 Hovaguimian also observed that 
upon obtaining a declaration of enforceability, “the creditor gained direct and 
unconditional access to the protective measures of the enforcement state”.91 
Furthermore, the abolition of the exequatur under Brussels i bis implies that 
protective measures are “immediately available to the creditor”.92
Unlike Capelloni and supporting commentaries, the English courts have 
considered the entitlement to seek protective orders in a rather permissive 
86 L. Pålsson, “Arts. 46–52” in: U. Magnus and P. Mankowski, Brussels i Regulation (2nd edn, 
Sellier European Law Publishers, 2012) p. 784.
87 Pålsson (n 86) p. 784.
88 Or a “judgment a posteriori confirming those measures”. Pålsson (n 86) 784.
89 Pålsson (n 86) 784. On the entitlement to enforce a “provisional measure under Art 24 
[of the Brussels Convention]” as a judgment, see P. Matthews, “Provisional and Protective 
Measures in England and Ireland and Common Law and under the Conventions: A Com­
parative Survey”, Civil Justice Quarterly (1995) pp. 190, 199–200.
90 F.J. Martín Mazuelos, “Notes on Protective and Cautionary Measures in Brussels i Recast 
and Land Registration” available on https://www.elra.eu/wp­content/uploads/2017/02/8. 
­Francisco­Martin­Mazuelos­Protective­and­Cautionary­Measures­in­Brussels­i­Recast 
­and­Land­Registration.pdf (accessed 9 March 2017). For a similar perspective from the 
Spanish (First Instance) court in the context of Capelloni, see https://w3.abdn.ac.uk/
clsm/eupillar/public/case/474 (accessed 10 March 2017).
91 This comment was made concerning art 47 of Brussels I.P. Hovaguimian, “The Enforce­
ment of Foreign Judgments under Brussels i Bis: False Alarms and Real Concerns”, Journal 
of Private International Law 11(2) (2015) pp. 212, 216–217.
92 (n 99) 217. See arts 39 and 40 of Brussels i bis.
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manner. In other words, there is no focus on any right to obtain protective or­
ders while appeals are pending. An example is Premium Jet ag v Sutton, a case 
decided considering Brussels i.93 The claimant obtained an interim charging 
order against the defendant’s property pursuant to article 38 of Brussels i. The 
court decided that the claimant was permitted to obtain the interim order for 
a preservation of property pending the final determination of enforcement of 
the judgment. Cases such as Sutton are relevant because references were made 
to Capelloni but without any specific consideration of entitlement to protec­
tive measures pending an appeal against a freezing order obtained in another 
Member State.94 In the next section, there is an examination of the English 
position on entitlement to protective measures pending appeals and the ex­
tent to which this position reflects a significant detachment from the cjeu 
case law.95
5 The English Position: Mapping the Limits of Inconclusive or 
Undetermined Rights
5.1 Cyprus Popular Bank Public Co Ltd v Vgenopoulos
The English position may be illustrated by the recent case of Cyprus Popular 
Bank Public Co Ltd v Vgenopoulos, decided with regard to Brussels i.96 This case 
is important because the judgment was detailed and it discussed the leading 
cjeu case of Capelloni which had been cited in support of the argument that 
the applicant was entitled to protective measures pending appeal.97 The Eng­
lish High Court also cited two leading authors in support of its view that the 
applicant was entitled to seek, but not necessarily be granted, protective mea­
sures with respect to the relevant assets.98
The claimant, a Cypriot company, obtained an interim wfo against the 
first to third defendants. The order also prohibited the twelfth defendant from 
transferring assets to the first to third defendants. The claimant sought to reg­
ister the wfo as an order of the English court in accordance with article 38 of 
Brussels 1. Upon registration, the claimant served the order and the wfo on a 
93 [2017] ewhc 186 (qb); See also Re Specification of A Deadline for Providing Security [2008] 
i.l.Pr. 5.
94 The court referred to Capelloni (n 43). See Sutton (n 93) para. 25.
95 See generally notes 43–45.
96 (n 10).
97 (n 10).
98 (n 10) 98.
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third party bank in England informing them that they were liable to contempt 
proceedings if they defaulted.99 The defendant appealed against the registra­
tion and a major issue was whether a foreign judgment became effective and 
enforceable as soon as it was registered, or only when the time limit to appeal 
expired, or when any appeal lodged was concluded.100
The English High Court decided that a foreign wfo did not become fully ef­
fective and enforceable in England merely upon registration as a judgment of 
the High Court under article 38 of Brussels i. The period for bringing an appeal 
must have expired, or where an appeal was lodged within time upon conclu­
sion of such an appeal.101 The claimant had to apply for a domestic freezing 
order as a protective measure pending the appeal against registration under 
article 47(2) (3) of the Regulation. In granting the application for a domestic 
freezing order, the court observed that it was purely discretionary for it to grant 
a protective measure pending appeal against the enforcement of the wfo.102 
The English court partly relied on an important case, Banco Nacional, in draw­
ing its conclusion that the judgment creditor was not entitled to a protective 
measure pending an appeal against a wfo. Thus, it is helpful to consider the 
case briefly.
5.2 Banco Nacional v Empresa
In Banco Nacional, the claimant obtained an Italian judgment against the de­
fendant. The claimant then sought to enforce the judgment in several Euro­
pean jurisdictions including England. Pursuant to article 47(1) of Brussels i, the 
claimant obtained a domestic freezing order and subsequently a wfo that in­
cluded an undertaking in respect of third party losses but which the claimant 
did not want. The Court of Appeal allowed the defendant’s appeal to discharge 
the wfo and, among others, made two pronouncements particularly relevant 
to this article. First, matters which are not covered by specific provisions 
in the Regulation fall within the remit of the procedural law of the court in 
which enforcement is sought.103 Secondly, applicants applying for provisional/ 
protective measures “must take them as he finds them” in any jurisdiction 
where enforcement is sought.104 These pronouncements are of particular rele­
vance to the provisional measures that can be obtained during appeals. Under 
99 Art 43(5) of Brussels i.
100 (n 10) 67–68.
101 (n 10) 80.
102 (n 10) 97–98.
103 Banco Nacional (n 63) para. 44.
104 Banco Nacional (n 63) para. 44.
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article 47(1) of Brussels i, “nothing shall prevent the applicant from availing 
himself of provisional, including protective, measures in accordance with the 
law of the Member State requested.”105 This provision clearly stipulates that 
the judgment creditor is entitled to seek protective measures. However, it is 
unlikely that an entitlement to seek such measures only was the sole intend­
ment of the European legislator because ensuring the fruits of a judgment will 
be realised is a practical consideration. There should be more.
5.3 Initial Case Analysis
Arguably, the judgment creditor is entitled to protective measures pending 
appeal since the wfo in question cannot be enforced until the appeal is con­
cluded. However, the English court’s interpretation was that granting such pro­
tective measures was purely a matter for judicial discretion.
There are some implications of the English court’s position. First, a pending 
appeal by the defendant in England where enforcement is sought will prevent 
the enforcement of a wfo. It is doubtful if this should be read as consistent 
with the spirit and rationale behind the automatic enforcement of judgments 
in the European Union. Secondly, the question of urgency and speed seem to 
be undermined. The appeal period thus exposes the claimant to possible loss 
since the wfo cannot be enforced until the conclusion of the appeal. Thirdly, 
the potential loss to which the claimant is exposed is compounded by the dis­
cretionary attitude of the High Court to grant a domestic freezing order pend­
ing the appeal. There is thus a need to reflect on the effects and limits that 
wfos should have in Europe.106
Why should a litigant who obtained a wfo in a Member State risk a dissipa­
tion of assets because the court in which an enforcement is sought may decide 
that the judgment creditor is not entitled to protective measures pending ap­
peal? This question is especially important as protective measures should not 
vary or cause any irreversible loss. If the process of enforcing the wfos is not 
certain, how does that foster mutual trust in Europe?107 First, a fundamental 
aim of wfos is to avoid a dissipation of assets. If this cannot be guaranteed 
speedily, it is arguable that there is an implied recharacterisation of the wfo. 
105 A declaration of enforceability under art 41 is not required for this. See art 47(1) of Brus­
sels i.
106 In Fentiman’s view, the requirement that the foreign court should have jurisdiction 
concerning the substance of the matter to ensure provisional measures are enforceable 
“diminishes the effectiveness of judgments obtained in the eu”. See Fentiman (n 7) para. 
17.221.
107 Mutual trust will be discussed later.
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This implied recharacterisation does not foster legal certainty and predictabil­
ity. Secondly, the rationale behind mutual trust in Europe indicates faith in 
judicial institutions other than those in the jurisdiction where enforcement 
of the foreign order is sought. Thirdly, the non­enforcement of a wfo because 
there is a pending appeal arguably needs to be reconciled with the enforce­
ment of a wfo where there was no prior hearing of all the parties whose rights 
may be affected by such an order.
In the light of the foregoing analysis, it is interesting that the English High 
Court in Vgenopoulos partly found support in the leading English authority 
on the private international law: Dicey, Morris and Collins. In declaring that a 
judgment creditor was not entitled to protective measures pending an appeal 
against the enforcement of a wfo, the court observed that there was a “strong 
presumption in favour of the relief being granted”.108 This comment was made 
in the context of article 47(1) of the Brussels Regulation. The Vgenopoulos court 
also relied on Briggs which is particularly significant because Briggs first con­
cedes that under Capelloni, there was a right to obtain protective measures. 
The Vgenopoulos court quoted a footnote: “In 119/84 Capelloni v Pelkmans [1985] 
1 cmlr 388, it was suggested that there was a right to obtain such measures, but 
the truth probably is that there is a right to apply and the court has a discre­
tion, which it may exercise in the applicant’s favour, to grant the relief applied 
for.”109 It is also significant that Briggs expressed doubt regarding his view that 
the court had a discretion in the matter.
Some other leading authors seem to have avoided the controversy. Fenti­
man noted that claimants who obtained judgments in Member States “may 
seek enforcement in England, supported by freezing and disclosure orders”,110 
and he referred to relevant provisions of Brussels i and Brussels i bis.111 Ad­
mittedly, his comment does not necessarily imply that the English court must 
grant protective measures pending appeals. This comment, however, also does 
not imply that the English court has a discretion regarding the application 
for protective measures. Arguably, the only clear deduction that can be made 
from the statement is that the applicant can apply for domestic freezing orders 
to support the enforcement of the judgment which was obtained in another 
108 Dicey, Morris and Collins (n 28) para. 8–046.
109 A. Briggs, Civil Jurisdiction in Judgments (6th edn, Informa Law, 2015) para. 7.27 fn 274, 
quoted by the court at p. 98 of Vgenopoulos.
110 Fentiman (n 7) para. 17.16.
111 Art 40 of Brussels i bis and art 47(1) of Brussels i.
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Member State.112 In connection with article 47(1) of Brussels i, Dickinson ar­
gued that a claimant who obtained a judgment in another Member State “may 
seek protective measures under the law of the enforcing Member State, with­
out obtaining a declaration of enforceability”.113 This is subject to the judgment 
being recognised under the Regulation.114
The common denominator between appeals and hearing people whose 
rights may be affected by a judgment, is whether and how rights may be deter­
mined conclusively and enforced. Such conclusiveness also implies the need 
to prevent a pre­emptive curtailment of individual rights or even loss. The en­
forcement of a wfo by a court of a Member State without a prior hearing of 
parties whose rights may be affected, was discussed at length in Meroni.
5.4 Meroni v Rocoletos Ltd – a Helpful Analogy From the cjeu
Unlike Vgenopoulos where the claimant sought to enforce a Cypriot wfo in 
England,115 in Meroni v Rocoletos Ltd the claimant sought to enforce an English 
wfo in Latvia.116 This case is insightful in the current analysis because it in­
dicates the need to promote the free movement of European freezing orders 
among Member States by ensuring the defence of public policy is interpreted 
very narrowly. Also, Meroni invites reflection on whether there is any room for 
the English courts to be more liberal in supporting the free movement of Euro­
pean freezing orders vis­à­vis the Brussels legal regime.
In Meroni, the English High Court granted a freezing order which prohibited 
the defendant from dissipating his interests in a Latvian company. Those in­
terests also extended to a Dutch company. The Latvian and Dutch companies 
were not parties to the English freezing order proceedings. However, under 
English law, a freezing order became effective on a third party upon notifica­
tion and the third party was then entitled to contest the order. The director of 
the Dutch company appealed against the Latvian court’s declaration that the 
English freezing order was enforceable in Latvia. On a reference by the Latvian 
Supreme Court, the question before the cjeu was whether the enforcement 
of an order from a Member State’s court without a prior hearing of a third 
112 At this stage, the English court cannot grant a wfo. See Fentiman (n 7) para. 17.16; Dicey, 
Morris and Collins (n 28) para. 8–046.
113 A. Dickinson, “The Revision of the Brussels i Regulation: Surveying the Proposed Brussels 
i Bis Regulation – Solid Foundations but Renovation Needed”, Yearbook of Private Interna-
tional Law 12 (2010) 266.
114 Dickinson (n 113) 266.
115 (n 10).
116 (n 9).
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party whose rights may be affected was “manifestly contrary to public policy 
in the Member State in which recognition is sought”.117 The cjeu answered 
the question in the negative, in so far as such a third party was entitled to as­
sert his rights before that court in which enforcement of the foreign order was 
sought.118 The third party could request that the order be varied or set aside.119
In Vgenopoulos (where the English High Court decided that it was discre­
tionary to grant protective measures pursuant to a wfo enforcement pending 
appeal),120 the claimant argued that Meroni supported his position that judg­
ment creditors were entitled to protective measures in the enforcing court.121 
This was because there was no indication that the English freezing order 
“ceased to be enforceable or effective in view of the appeal brought against 
its recognition in Latvia after it had become enforceable”.122 In rejecting that 
argument, the Vgenopoulos court distinguished the Meroni case partly on the 
basis that it was necessary to apply for a declaration of enforceability and an 
interim protective measure.123 In Vgenopoulos, the claimant applied for a dec­
laration of enforceability but not an interim measure. The court in Vgenopou-
los thus considered that applying for both at once was appropriate where the 
“judgment” sought to be enforced was a wfo.124 Although the court consid­
ered that the facts of Meroni were not relevant to the issues before the Vgeno-
poulos court, Meroni itself indicated the cjeu’s inclination to facilitate the free 
movement of judgments with little or no impediments. This inclination is un­
derscored by the cjeu’s very narrow and strict interpretation of public policy.
6 Public Policy
There is a public policy rationale behind preventing judgment debtors from 
handling their assets, especially when enforcement appeals are pending. 
117 Case C­559/14 (n 9) para. 8.
118 Ibid (n 117) para. 55.
119 Ibid (n 117) para. 49.
120 (n 10) 97–98.
121 (n 10) 91.
122 (n 10) 91.
123 (n 10) 92. Under Brussels i bis, there is no need for a declaration of enforceability for a 
judgment given in a Member State to be enforced by another Member State. See art 39 of 
Brussels i bis.
124 (n 10) 92. Generally, cases such as Vgenopoulos remain relevant even under Brussels i 
bis because the focus was on enforcement rather than how the foreign court exercised 
jurisdiction.
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Protecting such assets helps to ensure: the enforcement of judgments, con­
servation of resources, and the integrity of the legal process.125 Admittedly, 
the interests of judgment creditors, judgment debtors and States should be 
considered. A balance should be struck between the claimants’ need to access 
their funds and the defendants’ need to avoid suffering disadvantages or even 
measures of enforcement that cannot be reversed.126 Such a balance reflects 
core public policy considerations which underlie international commercial 
litigation.
European case law on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judg­
ments provides a firm foundation for public policy to support the free move­
ment of judgments. There has been a discussion of very recent cases in the 
specific context of protecting assets pending appeals against the enforcement 
of wfos.127 In addition, there are other landmark cases which provide a gen­
eral indication of how public policy should be used positively. Guided by a 
reference to the cjeu,128 the English Court of Appeal in Orams v Apostolides 
observed that it would be contrary to the spirit of Brussels i to ensure the free 
movement of judgments if a declaration of enforceability was dependent on 
“factual conditions”129 regarding the enforcement of the judgment where it 
was given.130 Nearly a decade earlier, the cjeu interpreted public policy in a 
manner that facilitated the free movement of foreign judgments considering 
BrusselsI.131
Maintaining a strict and narrow interpretation of public policy in the recog­
nition and enforcement of foreign judgments under Brussels i bis underscores 
the need to consider how the free movement of judgments can be promoted. 
Article 41(1) of Brussels i bis provides that the procedure for the enforcement 
of judgments in another Member State shall be governed by the law of that 
Member State.132 However, the question is whether there is much scope, if at 
all, for discretion or even interference by the court in which enforcement is 
sought. Arguably, the abolition of a declaration of enforceability drives the 
125 Fentiman (n 7) para. 17.02.
126 A. Briggs, Private International Law in English Courts (Oxford University Press, 2014) para. 
6.94. See also A. Dickinson, “Provisional Measures in the ‘Brussels 1’ Review: Disturbing 
the Status Quo?”, Journal of Private International Law 6(3) (2010) 564.
127 E.g. Meroni (n 9).
128 Case C­420/07.
129 Such as an in­depth consideration of internal political intricacies.
130 See para. 98 of the Court of Appeal judgment; para. 62 of the cjeu judgment.
131 See generally, Case­7/98 Bamberski v Krombach; [2001] q.b. 709.
132 See also art 41(2) of Brussels i bis.
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Brussels jurisprudence towards facilitating the enforcement of wfos.133 If 
the enforcement of foreign judgments is automatic and subject to very nar­
row public policy exceptions, the court in which enforcement is sought should 
not exercise any discretion in protecting the assets which are the subject mat­
ters of appeals. There is a further implication of the new provisions of Brussels 
i bis. Unlike Brussels i which stipulated a definite time frame within which 
appeals against the registration may be brought, there is no order to appeal 
against under Brussels i bis.134 The absence of a definite time frame arguably 
also implies that, in theory at least, there is no time limit to apply for an order 
refusing enforcement.135 Such permutations notwithstanding, the abolition of 
a declaration of enforceability clearly signals a seamless procedure for the rec­
ognition and enforcement of foreign judgments among Member States. Such a 
procedure is driven not only by a narrow and positive interpretation of public 
policy, but also by an effective application of mutual trust.
7 Mutual Trust
One of the cardinal applications of mutual trust is that within the uniform 
European Union judicial space, litigants’ rights can be protected efficiently be­
fore the courts of any Member State.136 Mutual trust is particularly important 
with respect to foreign judicial acts.137 The persistent advancement of mutual 
trust in the European Union judicial space is underscored by the removal of 
the exequatur.138
If mutual trust has the effect of foreign judgments obtained in Member 
States being essentially the same as local judgments in other Member States, 
effective control should promote this certainty. For control to have its full 
133 Art 39 of Brussels i bis provides for enforcement in Member States without any declara­
tion of enforceability.
134 Briggs (n 126) para. 6.103.
135 Briggs conceded that this should be different in practice. He also argued that the new pro­
visions in Brussels i bis concerning applications and appeals against decisions could lead 
to “more… possibilities of appeal than is the case under Regulation 44/2001”. See Briggs 
(n 126) para. 6.103.
136 Z.C. Reghizzi, “‘Mutual Trust’ and ‘Arbitration Exception’ in the European Judicial Area: 
the West Tankers Judgment of the ecj”, Yearbook of Private international Law 11 (2009) 438.
137 M. Weller, “Mutual Trust: In Search of the Future of European Private International Law”, 
Journal of Private International Law 11(1) (2015) 100.
138 Weller (n 137) 82. See also art 52 of Brussels i bis.
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effect, such control should be exercised by someone other than the person 
sought to be controlled.139 The minimisation or even lack of such control in 
the context of third States may be justifiable,140 but the scope of discretion in 
issues directly related to the free movement of judgments in Member States 
should be very narrow. This is evidenced by the very narrow interpretation 
given to the public policy exception in the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments obtained in Member States.
The application and importance of mutual trust in facilitating the free 
movement of judgments can be illustrated by the Brussels legal regime and 
the case law of the cjeu. A relevant case is Prism Investments bv v van der 
Meer.141 This case concerned a reference from the Dutch Supreme Court. The 
cjeu considered that in the light of recitals 16 and 17 in the preamble to Brus­
sels i, the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments framework was 
based on mutual trust concerning the administration of justice in the Europe­
an Union. This implied that “judicial decisions delivered in one Member State 
are not only recognised automatically in another Member State, but also that 
the procedure for making those decisions enforceable in that Member State is 
efficient and rapid”.142 If this position was taken when there was a need first to 
obtain a declaration of enforceability,143 it seems clear that the need for a judg­
ment creditor to obtain protective measures pending appeal as of right is even 
more persuasive under Brussels i bis.
If European judgments are automatically enforceable, then it means that 
the judgment creditor has the “judgment” until the appeal against the enforce­
ment is successful. Thus, the judgment creditor not only has a right to apply 
for protective measures but also a right to obtain them since such measures 
merely preserve the current legal or factual situation. There is much to recom­
mend in the view that mutual trust should have its limits especially where facts 
on the ground suggest that mutual trust may be the “reality only to a limited 
degree”.144 Nevertheless, the nature of provisional or protective measures rein­
forces why mutual trust is a particularly useful tool. Such measures are neither 
139 Weller (n 137) 71.
140 Residual rules of jurisdiction under the Brussels legal regime.
141 Case C­139/10; (2012) i.l.Pr. 13.
142 (n 141) para. 27.
143 See art 43(5) and 45 of Brussels i; van der Meer (n 141) para. 11, 38 and 43.
144 In the context of the November 2013 Eurobarometer on “Justice in the European Union”, 
Weller contended that “a considerable number of eu citizens do not trust their own na­
tional justice system”. See Weller (n 137) 66–67. See also X. Kramer: Procedure Matters: 
Construction and Deconstructivism in European Civil Procedure (Eleven International Pub­
lishing, 2013) p. 27.
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irreversible nor conclusively determine litigants’ rights and obligations. Em­
phasising such special features of wfos invites reflection on whether subsum­
ing provisional or protective measures under “judgment” is appropriate.
8 Possible (Re)characterisation of “Judgment” and Post-Brexit
8.1 Judgment or Order?
The question of what amounts to provisional measures or the characterisation 
of freezing orders as judgments is reflected in the effects of an appeal. Extend­
ing the effects of a judgment to a wfo has its advantages but such an extension 
also implies possible non­enforcement of a provisional or protective order. It 
may seem persuasive to argue that the discretion of the enforcing court to stay 
enforcement pending appeals depends on whether such an enforcement is re­
versible. However, this argument would also suggest that such a wfo should 
not have been granted in the first place and that its characterisation as a provi­
sional or protective order was misplaced.
The adaptation of the wfo to whatever exists locally seems practical.145 
However, such adaptation is another reason to consider if the current char­
acterisation of judgments under the Brussels legal regime suffices or if there 
is a need for a separate legal regime for “provisional, including protective, 
measures”.146
8.2 A Post-Brexit Legal Order
The definition of “judgment” under the Brussels i bis implies that “provisional, 
including protective measures” can only be ordered by courts which have ju­
risdiction over the substance of the dispute.147 This implies that an English 
wfo may be enforced in another Member State but would not be enforceable 
if such a wfo is granted pursuant to Section 25 of the cjja.148 This Act is at 
the centre of many controversies regarding English wfos and it is possible, 
but perhaps unlikely, that its relevance in a post­Brexit Europe may not be dis­
counted altogether. Notwithstanding the perception that the United Kingdom 
was probably not the most fastidious Member State vis­à­vis the Brussels legal 
145 Art 54(1) of Brussels i bis.
146 See generally, Hess, Pfeiffer and Schlosser (n 4) para. 782.
147 Art 2 of Brussels i bis.
148 Fentiman (n 7) para. 12.217. See (n 28).
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regime even before Brexit,149 it would be speculative to have an in­depth dis­
cussion concerning a post­Brexit Europe in this article.
If the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union involves a complete 
disapplication of the Brussels legal regime, there could be a default application 
of rules that apply to third States. Thus, applications made outside the Brussels 
legal regime or the Lugano Convention, i.e. Section 25 of the cjja, may require 
the same jurisdictional terms as the court would adopt when considering if it 
would be expedient to grant a protective order.150 This would imply a greater 
degree of judicial discretion generally and the judicial decisions concerning 
protective measures would be more difficult to monitor or enforce.151 Such dis­
cretion may be reflected in ostensible flexibility with all the attendant risks. 
Any flexibility outside the Brussels legal regime should be exercised in a man­
ner that promotes legal certainty but this is very difficult, if not impossible, to 
guarantee.152 Corollary issues such as comity may also arise in the context of 
third States.153
9 Conclusions
The need to enforce freezing orders from other countries is underscored by 
the increasing complexity of international commercial transactions and un­
derpinned by free movement within the European Union. Sometimes, it can 
be challenging to strike a balance between individual Member States’ judi­
cial practices, including discretion, and the overarching Brussels legal regime. 
However, it is critical to attain such a balance and defer to the Brussels legal 
regime if legal certainty is to be ensured in the European judicial area. This 
149 In addition to the arguments in this article, the uk did not adopt Regulation 655/2014 
“which established the European Account Preservation Order procedure to facilitate 
cross­border recovery in civil and commercial matters.”
150 Dicey, Morris and Collins (n 28) para. 8–046; Banco Nacional (n 63). See also (n 28).
151 Hill and Shύilleabháin (n 72) para. 2.288–2.289.
152 Kruger argued that even Brussels i regarding provisional measures was “formulated 
vaguely and responsible for much uncertainty”. See Kruger (n 62) 341. See also, J. Weber, 
“Universal Jurisdiction and Third States in the Reform of the Brussels i Regulation”, Max 
Planck Private Law Research Paper 75 11/7 (2011) 619, 644.
153 Hatzimihail and Nuyts observed that wfos raised similar questions as anti­suit injunc­
tions. See N. Hatzimihail and A. Nuyts, “Judicial Cooperation between the United States 
and Europe in Civil and Commercial Matters: An Overview of Issues (1)” in: A. Nuyts and 
N. Watté (n 62) p. 9.
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certainty is especially necessary for judgment creditors who obtain freezing 
orders from other Member States and need to ensure that judgment debtors’ 
assets are not dissipated pending appeals against the enforcement of such for­
eign orders.
A balancing act is necessary from at least two perspectives: public policy and 
mutual trust. The Brussels legal regime indicates a clear gravitation towards a 
strict limitation of national public policies. This article argues that a pragmat­
ic application of public policy should promote the entitlement of judgment 
creditors to have assets protected during appeals against the enforcement of 
worldwide freezing orders. Furthermore, although mutual trust is a core prin­
ciple underlying the Brussels legal regime, it is also critical to strike a balance 
between “(far­reaching) trust and residual control”.154 This balance is particu­
larly necessary in the context of enforcing freezing orders obtained in other 
Member States.
Whether an entitlement to protective orders can be ensured by recharacter­
ising “judgment” under the Brussels legal regime or providing a separate and 
complete legal framework will help, is a matter for some other research. For 
now, the question is why a judgment creditor should be uncertain about ob­
taining protective measures pending an appeal against the enforcement of a 
freezing order emanating from another Member State. Neither public policy, 
mutual trust nor residual control should undermine the free movement of 
judgments in the European judicial area, especially with the abolition of the 
exequatur.155
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